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AT THE CROSSROADS OF AGE AND DISABILITY:
CAN PRACTITIONERS RELY ON THE AMENDED
ADA AND THE ADEA TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
RECOURSE FOR THE OLDER DISABLED
INDIVIDUAL?
Christopher E. Pashler' and Brian C. Lambert-

INTRODUCTION

Consider the role of age in the following hypothetical situations:
an older obese man with adult onset diabetes is terminated from
his position because his employer believes that he is at an
increased risk for cardiovascular disease; an older applicant is
turned down for a job because she is experiencing osteoarthritis;
and an older employee is terminated because the employer
perceives the applicant will be unable to do his job due to vision
loss.*
These three hypothetical scenarios illustrate that age and
disability often are not discrete categories, but rather
interconnected, as age can adversely impact an individual's
ability to function by accelerating the progression of a physical
disability. For an elder law practitioner representing such
individuals, two avenues for redress are the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in
*J.D., University of Iowa (2000). Mr. Pashler practices law in Chicago,
Illinois. Mr. Pashler will be a Lecturer of Law at the University of
Buffalo Law School beginning in August 2009.
J.D., Marquette University Law School (2006).
**Thanks to Steve Nadle of the Ahlers Firm in Des Moines, Iowa, who
-

suggested these hypothetical situations to illustrate the relationship
between age and disability.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
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§§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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Individually, however, these
Employment Act (ADEA). 2
statutes provide an imperfect avenue for an older disabled
individual for a number of reasons. Thus, the elder law
practitioner must consider whether it would be appropriate to
file an ADA claim in addition to an ADEA claim when a client's
case includes issues of both disability and age.
With passage of the Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 20083 (ADAAA), Congress has made
specific changes to the ADA that have the potential to broaden
the scope of the ADA. This article considers the potential impact
of the ADAAA on disabled individuals who are bringing agerelated ADA claims and contrasts those strategic considerations
in bringing similar claims under the ADEA.
For the elder law practitioner representing a client who has
suffered discrimination by an employer or potential employer,
the ADA may not seem to be an obvious choice. For one, the
ADA does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of
age.' However, the ADA may provide a viable theory for
recovery given that Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination
in "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, and conditions, and privileges of employment,"
and given that the ADA's extension coverage to employees
whose age-related impairments substantially limit a major life
activity. 5 Secondly, age-related disability claims have been
negatively impacted by the Supreme Court's decisions in Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,6 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,/
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
3. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553. S. 32406 passed the Senate on Sept. 11, 2008, and the House of
Representatives on Sept. 17, 2008; with President Bush's signature on Sept. 25, 2008
it became Public Law No. 110-325.
4. See generally Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (As the First
Circuit noted, "Congress made plain that the age statute was not meant to prohibit
employment decisions based on factors that sometimes accompany advancing age,
such as declining health or diminished vigor and competence." Id. at 1016.).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
6. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded
by statute, Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
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Bragdon v. Abbott,8 and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.9 These
decisions effectively held that a court's disability determinations
are narrow with regard to what substantially limits major life
activities and must be made with regard to a plaintiff's
mitigating measures, such as medication (e.g., blood pressure
medication) or other assistive devices. 0
Pleading an ADEA claim in an employment discrimination
situation may be the obvious choice given that it is illegal under
the ADEA for an employer to "refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's age." 1
Additionally, the ADEA prohibits an employer from acting to
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of ... age."12 However, there are numerous
obstacles to maintaining an ADEA claim, whether the claim is
premised on a theory of disparate impact or disparate
treatment.13
Thus, challenges exist for the practitioner in asserting either
an ADEA claim or an ADA claim that relates to age and

325, 122 Stat. 3553.
7. See generally Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
8. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
9. See generally Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
10. Alison Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Envisioning a Future for
Age and Disability DiscriminationClaims, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 263, 284-85 (2001).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
12. Id. (a)(2).
13. Keith R. Fentonmiller & Herbert Semmel, Where Age and Disability Intersect:
An Overview of the ADA for the ADEA Practitioner,10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J.
227, 284 (2000); see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (noting that the
plaintiff's failure to identify the specific practice being challenged could result in
increased liability for employers due to mere statistical imbalances.); see also Kelly v.
Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3rd Cir. 1996) (rejecting disability plus argument by
reasoning that "a person in a group protected from adverse employment actions i.e.,
anyone, could establish a prima facie discrimination case merely by demonstrating
some adverse action against the individual and that the employer was aware that
the employee's characteristic placed him or her in the group, e.g., race, age, or sex.").
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disability. 4 The purpose of this article will be to explore the
impact of recent ADEA litigation and the ADAAA on
practitioners considering pleading either (or both) causes of
action.
Section I of this article will consider how the ADAAA
broadens the scope of the ADA. Specifically, this section will
consider how the courts drastically limited the scope of the
ADA, particularly in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.'5 and Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.16 This section
will argue that the legislative history of the ADAAA, which
clearly rejects the holdings of both Sutton and Williams, supports
a more liberal interpretation of the "substantially limits"
requirement of the ADA that should benefit older disabled
individuals.
Section II will consider the obstacles practitioners face in
asserting ADEA claims on behalf of older disabled plaintiffs. In
particular, this section will consider the viability of disparate
impact claims following Smith v. City of Jackson.17 Additionally,
in this section, we will consider the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory," and
whether the rejection of the more stringent business necessity
defense in favor of the defense of reasonable factors other than
age will make it easier for defendants to defend against ADEA
claims.
Section III will examine how courts have treated age related
impairments, including arthritis, vision loss, and heart disease.
Specifically, this section will consider how courts have looked at
these impairments through the prism of age in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
14. See Barnes, supra note 10, at 271.
15. See generally Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
16. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002), superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
17. See generally Smith, 544 U.S. 228.
18. See generally Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., No. 06-1505, 1128 S. Ct.
2395 (U.S. June 19, 2008).
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This section will also analyze what effect the ADAAA is likely to
have.
In Section IV, we will scrutinize whether Congress' failure
to provide instruction as to what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation will have a negative impact on older disabled
individuals.
SECTION I
Passed by Congress and signed by the President in September
2008, the ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009.19 It was
described by Senator Harkin as a "clarification and instruction"
regarding the ADA and was a direct response to decisions of the
Supreme Court which had been seen as restricting the original
meaning of the ADA. 20 Legislative history identifies two
particular cases, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,21 and Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 22 which
Commentators have
prompted congressional reaction.2 3
observed that these cases and their progeny have greatly
restricted a plaintiff's ability to successfully bring an ADA
claim. 24
THE PRE-AMENDMENT ADA

Prior to the ADAAA, courts used the language of the ADA
to narrow its applicability. 25 The Supreme Court often used
arguments that were very language specific to develop these
19. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,

§ 3406, 122 Stat 3553.
20. 154 Cong. Rec. S8840-01 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
21. See generally Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
22. See generally Williams, 534 U.S. 184, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
23. Statement of Sen. Harkin, supra note 20.
24. Barnes, supra note 10, at 284.
25. See generally Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Williams,
534 U.S. 184, superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
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restrictions. Under the ADA, a "qualified individual with a
disability" was defined as "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."2 6 A disability was similarly defined
as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."2 7
In explaining the components of the definition of disability,
a physical or mental impairment was defined as
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including
speech
organs),
cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities. 28
"Major life activity" was defined in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations as "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29
"Substantially limits" was defined in EEOC regulations as
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform;
or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.3 0
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2008).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(12) (2008); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2008).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2008).
Id. at § 1630.2(i).
Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1) (Section 1630.2(j) continues to define factors to be used in
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SUPREME COURT CASES
Over the last decade, significant Supreme Court cases have
shaped the restrictive treatment ADA claims have received. In
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court held that mitigating
measures must be taken into account in an ADA disability
determination." The Sutton sisters, despite severe myopia, each
applied for positions as commercial airline pilots. 32 United
Airline's hiring policy mandated a minimum uncorrected visual
acuity of 20/100 for their new pilot hires. 33 Although both
Suttons met the other basic qualifications, when it was
discovered that neither sister's uncorrected vision met this
requirement, their interviews were cancelled and neither Sutton
was offered a position.34 The district court, as affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit, held that because the Suttons' vision was
correctable and no disability existed, their uncorrected vision
did not substantially limit any major life activity.35
In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court examined
the language of the ADA and EEOC regulations to determine
"whether disability is to be determined with or without
reference to corrective measures."3 6 The Court relied on three
provisions of the ADA to support its holding that corrective

"determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."
With respect to the major life activity of working, the regulations continue, defining
that determination as "substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.").
31. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475, superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 476.
34. Id. at 475-76. The airline's basic qualifications included age, education,
experience, and FAA certification requirements.
35. Id. at 476-77.
36. Id. at 478-81.
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measures should be considered in the disability determination.3 7
It determined that the phrase "substantially limits" must refer to
a present limitation; 8 that a disability determination is an
individualized inquiry, which requires an examination of each
individual's level of correction; 9 and that the Congress'
reference in the ADA to "43,000,000 Americans" with disabilities
is incongruent with including in the definition of disability all
those Americans with corrected impairments. 40 Following this
logic, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the Sutton sisters'
claim. 41
In 2002, the Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams 42 continued its restrictive reading of the ADA in
its interpretation of the "substantial limitation" test. Williams
was an automobile assembly line worker who had developed
carpal tunnel syndrome from her work activities and was placed
on work restrictions.43 Williams was transferred to a work team
that allowed her to work without aggravating her condition. 44
However, the defendant then required her to rotate through jobs
requiring heavy use of her hands and arms, thus inflaming her
carpal tunnel syndrome. 45 After disagreements over her request
to be placed back on her former duty schedule, she was
terminated for a poor attendance record. 46
The Supreme Court considered Williams' argument that she
was substantially limited in her major life activities, including
performing manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with
37. Id. at 482.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 483.
40. Id. at 484-86 (On this point, the court was not able to determine the exact
source of the 43,000,000 figure, but maintained that it could not possibly include all
Americans "whose impairments are largely corrected by medication or other
devices.").
41. Id. at 494.
42. See generally Williams, 534 U.S. 184, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
43. Id. at 187-88.
44. Id. at 188-89.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Id. at 189-90.
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her children, lifting, and working.4 7
After examining the
potential meanings of "substantial" and "major life activities,"
the Court concluded "[t]hat these terms need to be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled." 48 The Court again referenced the 43,000,000 disabled
Americans figure and reasoned that such a number cannot be
congruent with an expansive definition of disability.4 9 From
that, the Court held that "to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to people's
daily lives."s0 In again concluding that the ADA required a
strict, individualized assessment for a disability determination,
the Court constricted the definition of a substantial limitation in
the ADA.51
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE - THE ADAAA

The ADAAA was specifically intended to annul the
Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the definition of disability
in the ADA and to remove the language in the Act that might
lead to such a reading.5 2
REVERSAL OF THE SUPREME COURT'S REQUIREMENT OF A
DEMANDING STANDARD

Drawing from the Court's reasoning in Sutton and Williams,
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 196-97.
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id. at 198.
51. See generally Williams, 534 U.S.184, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
52. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 3406, 122 Stat 3553 §§ 2(a)(4)-(6), 2(b)(2)-(5); Statement of Sen. Harkin, supra note
20 (The ADA Amendments Act "amends the definition of disability by providing
clarification and instruction about the terminology used in the definition, by
expanding the definition, and by rejecting several opinions of the United States
Supreme Court that have had the effect of restricting the meaning and application
of the definition of disability." Id.).
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the ADAAA removes the references to 43,000,000 disabled
Americans and language referring to individualized ADA
disability determinations.5 3 In response to the Supreme Court's
use of a "demanding standard" for disability determinations in
Williams," the language of the amendment makes clear the
broad perspective from which Congress intends the ADA be
interpreted.55
MITIGATING MEASURES
In a specific rebuke to Sutton, the ADAAA amends the ADA
to prevent mitigating measures from being taken into
consideration in the substantial limitation of a major life activity
determination. 6 The only circumstance where such mitigating
measures may be considered is in regards to common eyeglasses
and contact lenses.57 However, with a nod to the particulars of
Sutton, this exception does not apply in the event an employer
imposes employment qualifications based upon an employee's
(or prospective employee's) uncorrected vision."
"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS"
In addition, the Supreme Court's definition of "substantially

53. Statement of Sen. Harkin, supra note 20.
54. Williams, 534 U.S. at 197, superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
55. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 3406, 122 Stat 3553A, § 2(b)(1) ("to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing 'a
dear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination'
and 'clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination' by
reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA"); § 4(a)
§3(4)(A)) ("[t]he definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of this Act.") (amending 42 U.S.C. §12102.).
56. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 3406, 122 Stat 3553, § 4(a) 34(4)(E)(i)§3(4)(E)) ("The determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. . . .") (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102.)
57. Id. at §§ 3(4)(E)(ii) - (iii)(I) 4 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2101(1)(C)§§3(4)(E)(i)(I).
58. Id.
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limits" in Williams is directly overruled. 9 Specifically, in the
"Findings and Purposes" section, the ADAAA states that the
current definition of "substantially limits" is "inconsistent with
congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard."6 0
Rather, Congress stated that the "primary object of attention in
cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations,
and .. . the question of whether an individual's impairment is a
disability under the ADA should not demand extensive
analysis." 61 While the specific definition is left to the EEOC's
discretion to modify through regulation, Congress has clearly
directed that the definition must be broad, inclusive, and
"consistent with [the ADAAA]." 6 2
MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES

The ADAAA places - within the text of the ADA - the list of
major life activities originally found in EEOC regulations.
Congress also expanded the list to include as major life activities
sleeping, eating, standing, lifting, bending, reading,
concentrating, thinking, and communicating. 63 In addition, the
ADAAA adds a section on "Major Bodily Functions," stating
that "a major life activity also includes the operation of a major
bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the
immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and
reproductive functions."64 This new, expanded list of major life
activities represents a repudiation of courts that had viewed this
category narrowly. 65
59. Id. at § 2(a)(7).
60. Id. at § 2(a)(8).
61. Id. at § 2(b)(5).
62. Id. at § 2(b)(6).
63. Id. at § 2(b)(4) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12101.§3(2)(A)).
64. Id. at § 32(2)(B)(b)(4) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12101.3(2)(B)).
65. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities
Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw U.L.REV. COLLOQUY 217,
222 (2008).

MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR

194

[Vol. 10

In contrast to the restrictive treatment currently espoused
by the courts, the ADAAA represents a new, broad, inclusive
standard for ADA disability determinations.
SECTION II

Consider again the illustrations of older, disabled plaintiffs in
the introduction. Will their disability be a factor in an Age
Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) claim? While
the ADEA has provided a viable theory of recovery, there are
limitations to the scope of protection provided to older disabled
individuals by the ADEA. 66 The ADEA prohibits discrimination
in hiring practices, specifically limiting employers from taking
action that "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age." 67
However, the ADEA does not prohibit discrimination of
workers who have been discriminated against because of the
impact of disability.68 The two theories a plaintiff can use in
ADEA litigation are disparate treatment 69 -which is intentional
discrimination- and disparate impacto-which targets content

neutral rules or actions that would adversely affect older
individuals.
THE ADEA AND THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK

Given the textual similarities between Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1995 and the ADEA, as well as the similar goals of
each statute, ADEA litigation follows the same standard of proof
used in Title VII cases and outlined in McDonnell Douglas.7 1
Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination,

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 234.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2008).
Barnes, supra note 10, at 280.
See generally McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See generally Smith, 544 U.S. 228.
Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 266.
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the plaintiff must offer evidence that (1) he or she belongs to a
statutorily protected age group (in the case of the ADEA, an
individual over forty);72 (2) he or she was qualified for the
position and performing his or her job in an adequate manner,
(3) he or she was subject to a negative employment action or
policy despite his or her qualifications and performance; and (4)
he or she was disadvantaged in favor of a similarly situated
younger employee.7 1
Following the plaintiff's showing of a prima face case, the
burden shifts to the defendants to produce evidence that the
employment decision was based on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.74 If the defendant can produce this
evidence, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the
proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.75
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO ADEA DEFENDANTS

The effectiveness of the affirmative defenses an employer
can utilize has a negative impact on ADEA plaintiffs. The first
defense available in cases of disparate treatment is the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. 76
The ADEA
provides that an employer can consider age alone when "age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of a particular business."77 While the BFOQ
7
defense is to be narrowly construed,"
in order for an employer
to utilize the BFOQ defense, the employer must prove that
categorization of age is reasonably necessary to the essence of its
business. 79 An employer must prove reasonable cause exists to
72. A difficulty in pleading a prima facie ADEA case is showing that the
plaintiff was replaced by a younger worker. See generally Hoffman v. Primedia
Special Interest Publ'ns, 217 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc denied.
73. See McDonnell Douglass Corp. 411 U.S. at 792, 802.
74. Id. at 801-02.
75. Id. at 807.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
77. Id.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (2008).
79. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413-14, 418 (1985)
(holding that age is not accepted as a proxy for health due to inconsistencies in the
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believe that all, or substantially all, of individuals disqualified by
the age requirement would be unable to perform the duties of
the job, or that it is "'impossible, or highly impractical', to deal
with the older employees on an individualized basis."80 While
the ADEA prohibits mandatory retirement for most workers, as
a result of the BFOQ defense, employers may be able to enforce
mandatory retirement age for physically demanding positions,
or for "bona fide executives or high policy makers" due to
receive a substantial financial package upon retirement.81
The second defense available in claims based on disparate
impact and disparate treatment is the reasonable factors other
than age (RFOA) defense, which allows employers to make
"differentiation[s] [I based on reasonable factors other than

age."82
IMPACT OF THE RFOA DEFENSE ON DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,83 commentators noted the increasing hostility of
courts toward disparate impact claims and questioned the
continued viability of such claims.8 4 However, with its decision
in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit
split by holding that the ADEA allowed recovery in disparate
In Smith, the City of Jackson, Mississippi,
impact cases."
adopted a plan to attract more competitive police officers and
police dispatchers by raising salaries; workers with fewer than
five years of service received proportionately higher raises than
more senior employees (who were, in large part, over the age of
40).86 While holding that the ADEA authorized recovery on a
testing process); see generally Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th

Cir. 1976).
80. Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 413-14.
81. Barnes, supra note 10, at 271.

82. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
83.
84.
85.
86.

See generally Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
Barnes, supra note 10, at 279; Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 275.
Smith, 544 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 230-31.
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disparate impact theory, the Supreme Court cautioned that the
scope of liability was narrower than in Title VII cases.17 The
Court noted that a purpose of the amendment to Title VII of the
1991 Civil Rights Act was to expand the Court's narrow holding
in Ward's Cove Packing v. Atonio88 that limited an employer's
potential liability in disparate treatment cases. The Court
observed that the Ward's Cove test should still be applied to
ADEA cases because Congress did not choose to amend the
ADEA at the time it revised Title VII. 89
After Smith, there was confusion as to whether the RFOA
exemption was an affirmative defense for which the defendant
bore the burden of persuasion or whether the burden was placed
on a plaintiff to show that the non-age factor was unreasonable.
The Supreme Court's decision in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory, clarified that the RFOA defense is an affirmative
defense for which the employer bears both the burden of
production and persuasion.9 0 Smith and Meacham resolve
concerns about the continued viability of disparate impact
ADEA claims. However, Smith illustrates that older workers
will not be afforded the same level of protection enjoyed by Title
VII plaintiffs. 91
USE OF THE ADEA BY OLDER DISABLED PLAINTIFFS

DISPARATE TREATMENT

In disparate treatment cases, the ADEA remains a viable
cause of action for an older, disabled plaintiff where an ADA
claim may not survive summary judgment. For instance, in
Shaw v. Greenwich Anesthesiology Associates, the court considered

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 240.
Id. (citing Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atino, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
See generally Meacham, No. 06-1505, slip op. at 2398.
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240-41.
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Shaw's ADA and ADEA claims following her termination. 92
Shaw was an anesthesiologist who was diagnosed at age fortyeight with arthritis and at age fifty-five with thyroid deficiency. 93
Upon taking disability leave, Shaw entered into an agreement
with her employer to go to part-time work status. 94 Three
months into Shaw's leave, her treating physician notified her
employer that Shaw was totally disabled and unable to return to
work, and Shaw was terminated. 95 Prior to this termination, the
defendant had hired two anesthesiologists - ages thirty-two and
thirty-four- to assume Shaw's workload. 96
The trial court rejected Shaw's ADA claim, finding Shaw's
impairments did not substantially limit her activities of daily
living because Shaw had full use of her body and could still do
aerobics, swim, walk, and lift weights. 97 The court reasoned that
Shaw had merely shown evidence that her impairments would
limit her from working full-time as an anesthesiologist, not that
the impairments would prevent Shaw from working at all.9
The trial court's discussion of Shaw's ADEA claim
illustrates how facts that may undermine an ADA claim may
prove useful in an ADEA claim. The court rejected Shaw's
argument in her ADA claim that her demotion to a part-time
position was sufficient to show that the defendant regarded
Shaw as disabled.9 9 However, with regard to the ADEA claim,
the court reasoned the failure to offer someone part-time
employment might be an adverse employment action. 00 The
court noted the defendant's hiring of two younger
anesthesiologists to take over the workload of Shaw and two
other older doctors, who both went to part-time status, created
92. Shaw v. Greenwich Anesthesiology Assocs., 137 F.Supp. 2d 48, 52-54 (D.
Conn. 2001).
93. Id. at 52.
94. Id. at 52.
95. Id. at 52-53.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id. at 57.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 61.
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an inference of age discrimination.10
Shaw illustrates that despite its flaws, the ADEA may, in
certain instances, be more effective than the ADA. The severity
of Shaw's impairments was significant enough to interfere with
her capacity to work. Her ability to engage in certain activities
of daily living arguably undermined her ADA claim but may
not have had the same detrimental effect on an ADEA claim.
DISPARATE IMPACT

The somewhat tortured history of the Meacham litigation
illustrates the potential impact of the decision on disparate
impact litigation.
In Meacham, the employer instructed
managers to identify candidates for an "involuntary reduction in
force" by ranking candidates by three metrics: "performance,"
"flexibility," and "critical skills."10 2 The raw scores, plus points
added for years of service, determined the employees who
would be terminated. 0 3 Of the thirty-one employees eventually
laid off, thirty were over the age of forty.104
In its first consideration of Meacham, the Second Circuit had
applied the "business necessity" test to Meacham's ADEA
claims and had used the burden shifting analysis outlined in
Ward's Cove.105 The Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs on their disparate impact claim.106
However, following Smith, the Supreme Court remanded the
Meacham case. On remand, the Second Circuit instead applied
the "reasonableness" test set forth in Smith, which does not
require an employer to show there were alternative means of
achieving its goal that did not result in a disparate impact on a
protected class.'07 Although the Second Circuit incorrectly
101. Id. at 61-62.
102. Meacham, No. 06-1505, 128 S. Ct. slip op at 2398.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2006),
vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) [hereinafter "Meacham II"].
106. Id. at 141.
107. Id. at 141-43.
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placed the burden of persuasion on Meacham, the court's
analysis of whether Knoll's subjective assessments of its
employees satisfied the "reasonableness test" is instructive.
Knoll provided expert witness testimony that skilled managers,
familiar with the matrix criteria and established definitions and
guidelines, conducted the evaluations. 08 Additionally, manager
decisions were subject to review by general counsel, in
conjunction with human resources, as to any questions about
employee scoring.109 The court found that the criteria used was
reasonable, and appeared reluctant to second guess decisions
that were made through a "settled" process that relied on
"plainly relevant criteria."o10 Thus, while Smith represents a
victory for plaintiffs in that it preserves the disparate impact
theory in ADEA litigation, it also allows employers to use the
less restrictive "reasonableness" test.
CONCLUSION

The ADEA may provide a plausible alternative for the ADA
practitioner in cases of intentional discrimination against the
older disabled plaintiff. Assuming that the client can satisfy the
elements of a prima facie case, the ADEA may provide a better
option, as the client will not have to make a showing of a
substantial limitation to a major life activity.
In light of recent litigation concerning disparate impact and
the ADEA, the ADA may become a viable option, at least in the
context of the usage of medical examinations in the preemployment or job application process. Fentonmiller and
Semmel argue that the ADA may provide greater protection as
to medical inquiries and examinations in light of the ADA's
greater limitations on the proper usage of a medical
examination.11 ' If a medical examination has the effect of
108.
109.
110.
1984)).
111.

Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 144-45 (quoting Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2nd Cir.
Fentonmiller & Senmel, supra note 13, at 285.
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screening out disabled individuals, an employer will have to
show the examination was related to the job and in line with a
business necessity.'12 Recent case law supports the continued
viability of the argument that practitioners should consider
utilizing the ADA as opposed to the ADEA when challenging
medical examinations.11 3
SECTION III
Several challenges have faced practitioners in pursuing an ADA
claim on behalf of an older disabled plaintiff. While numerous
courts have considered claims involving impairments related to
the aging process, such as menopause, 114 arthritis," 5 vision
problems,1 6 and heart disease," 7 courts have restricted the
definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" under the
ADA. 118 An examination of relevant case law in these areas in
light of the ADAAA may provide a glimpse of how the ADAAA
will be treated by courts. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, in

112. Id. at 286.
113. See, e.g., Conroy v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 333 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that employer's directive requiring employee to bring
medical certification upon returning to work following an absence violated the
ADA.).
114. See generally Klein v. State of Fla., 34 F.Supp. 2d. 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(holding that menopause is generally not a disability because it does not cause
substantial limitations on a major life activity. Klein argued that she experienced
lethargy/chronobiology, which the court rejected as constituting a major life
activity); Manzi v. DiCarlo, 62 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) (holding that
menopause is not a disability).
115. See generally Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F,3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that claimant's rheumatoid arthritis was an impairment); Dvorak v.
Mostardi Platt Assocs., 289 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding summary judgment
in favor of employer but noting that rheumatoid arthritis constituted impairment);
Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2003); Ward v.
Massachusetts Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000); Shaw, 137 F.Supp.
2d. 48.
116. See generally Albertson's Inc., 527 U.S. 555; Wade v. General Motors Corp.,
No. 97-3378, slip op. at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998) (noting, in dicta, that "[t]he
inability to drive in darkness is a common phenomenon that, if classified as
disabling, would make most of the American population over the age of 45
'disabled' under the Act.").
117. See generally Weber v. Strippit, 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999).
118. See Barnes, supra note 10, at 285-86.
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distinguishing ADA and ADEA claims, has cautioned, "[o]ld
age . .. does not define a discrete and insular minority because

all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will
experience it."119 Thus, in all three of the hypothetical situations

posed in the introduction, a court would theoretically treat each
claim the same regardless of the age of the plaintiff. This
illustrates a problem for an elder law practitioner because the
ADA was not drafted to include cases at the intersection of age
and disability. 12 0
Courts use a three part test to establish disability
discrimination for employee claims.' First, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he is disabled under the ADA. 122 Second, the
plaintiff must show that he is qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job, either with or without reasonable
accommodation. 12 3 Third, the plaintiff must have suffered from
an adverse employment action stemming from the disability.124
Courts have referred to the first criteria of the aforementioned
test, whether the plaintiff is in fact disabled under the ADA, as
the "threshold burden" of the analysis.125 To decide whether this
level of disability exists, courts have used a three-part test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott. 2 6 This
test first requires that the plaintiff possess a qualifying physical
or mental impairment.127 Second, the plaintiff must identify one
or more affected major life activities. 128 Third, the plaintiff must
119. Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs. for Ne. Ill.
Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 950, (7th Cir. 2000)(quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents 528
U.S. 62, 83 (2000)).
120. Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 290.
121. Moore, 221 F.3d at 950; see Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir.
1992); Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F.Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. 111.1998) (finding
reasonable issue of fact existed where plaintiff's impairment was a difficult
pregnancy); Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A., 43 F.Supp. 2d 1357, 1365
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
122. Moore, 221 F.3d at 950.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995)).
126. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits those
major life activities. 129 While courts often have an inclusive view
of what constitutes a physical or mental impairment, their
"major life activity" and "substantially limits" determinations
have often been very restrictive.13 0
Both regulations and case law concerning this issue would
seem to benefit older disabled plaintiffs.'3 ' A court's inquiry
should be individualized and fact specific,13 2 especially where
the symptoms of an impairment vary from person to person. 33
The regulations instruct that an individual has an impairment
that "substantially limits" a major life activity if he or she is
"[ulnable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform" or is "[slignificantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
[he or she] can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity."134 The regulations further provide that the
court should consider the "nature and severity," "duration or
expected duration," and "permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact" of the alleged
impairment. 3 5 If the plaintiff alleges that the impairment has
affected the major life activity of working, the court should
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 244.
132. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F.Supp. 2d 1097, 1129-30 (N.D.
Iowa 2002) (quoting Barnes v. Nw. Iowa Health Ctr., 238 F.Supp. 2d, 1053 (N.D.
Iowa 2002)) (concluding that plaintiff generated a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether her "mild" carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limited the plaintiff in
her major life activity of lifting. The court noted that Williams directed the court to
engage in an individualized inquiry as to how the impairments affected Martinez
because symptoms could vary in degree from person to person. Although the court
noted Martinez's carpal tunnel syndrome had been classified as "mild," there were
other causes to the impairment to her thumb. The court observed that Martinez
had presented evidence that her treating physician had restricted her to no use of
her right hand and noted that even this restriction had failed to improve her
condition.).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
135. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(2).
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consider whether the plaintiff is restricted in his or her ability
"to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs . . . as
compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills, and abilities."" 6
Numerous cases illustrate the negative impact Sutton,
Williams, and Bragdon have had on older plaintiffs. In Dvorak v.
Mostardi Platt Assocs., Inc.,137 Dvorak had arthroscopic surgery on
his knee in order to address arthritis problems; the most recently
Dvorak's arthritis had flared up so severely had been fifteen
years prior.3 8 Following surgery, Dvorak refused a field
assignment due to the fact he was on crutches and his treating
physician had restricted him to deskwork." 9 The court
ultimately held that Dvorak could not survive summary
judgment because he had not shown that he was terminated
because of his disability. 140
The Seventh Circuit expressed no opinion on the issue of
whether Dvorak was substantially limited, but noted that, under
the heightened standard of Williams, Dvorak would have to
show that his arthritis "'prevent[ed] or severely restrict[ed]' him
from walking, in a permanent or long-term way."141 The court
suggested that this determination would be difficult to make in
light of the record, but noted that the record did suggest
Dvorak's employer regarded him as being physically
impaired.142

136. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3).
137. Dvorak, 289 F.3d at 481 (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment
on ADA claim after concluding that plaintiff had been terminated for reasons not
related to his arthritis).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 669-70 (7th
Cir. 2000) (noting to make a prima facie case for disability discrimination, the
plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the definition of the ADA; (2)
that she is qualified to perform essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation; (3) she has faced an adverse employment decision
because of her disability).
141. Dvorak 289 F.3d at 484.
142. Id.
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Likewise, in Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix,143 the court relied on
Williams in considering
whether Wood's impairment
substantially limited his ability to walk. Although Wood
experienced numbness in his extremities, the court was quick to
note that he did not have a handicapped parking sticker and
could walk approximately one-quarter of a mile before needing
to rest.1 " However, Wood experienced numbness in his toes on
the left foot, and his left knee would collapse. 14 5 As a result of
these impairments, Wood had to occasionally use a cane.146 The
court noted in its conclusion-that Wood's difficulties with
fatigue after walking long distances and in climbing stairs were
moderate but not substantially limiting-was consistent with
Williams.147 Next, the court noted the "high bar set by Williams"
directed a conclusion that Wood's postural and exertional
limitations were "inconvenient" but were not substantially
limiting. 4 8
The decisions in Wood and Dvorak illustrate the possible
significance of the ADAAA. It is possible that the Wood court
would now reach a different conclusion given the reliance on
Williams, and a more liberal interpretation of "substantially
limits." However, the Dvorak court might have reached a similar
result in light of the court's examination of the less than
permanent nature of Dvorak's impairments. The ADAAA does
exclude "transitory and minor impairments" in the "regarded
as" prong, but does not address the holding in Williams that an
impairment must have a permanent or long-term impact.14 9
A significant question remains as to how courts will apply
the ADA Amendment's new standard for "substantially
50
limited." Since the Supreme Court's rulings in Williams,1
143. See generally Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003).
144. Id. at 685.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 685-86.
149. Long, supra note 65, at 227.
150. See generally Williams, 534 U.S. at 187, superseded by statute, Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
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Sutton,"' and Bragdon,15 2 numerous cases have considered the
ADA claims of elderly for their age related impairments.
As discussed above, courts appear to be willing to accept
limiting conditions of the elderly as impairments, but will often
stop short of holding that they substantially limit a major life
activity. For the purposes of this article, we have looked at how
courts have treated three common age related impairments:
arthritis, vision loss, and heart disease.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: ARTHRITIS, VISION LOSS, AND HEART
DISEASE

ARTHRITIS, OSTEOARTHRITIS, AND DEGENERATIVE JOINT DISEASE
While courts have acknowledged that arthritis is an
impairment, 53 they have been less open to view it generally as a
disability under the ADA. Plaintiffs can identify such postural
and exertional limitations as sitting, standing, lifting, and
reaching as major life activities, which would seem to benefit an
older plaintiff, because arthritis can impair an individual's
5 4 Arguably,
ability to perform these functions.1
courts have been
somewhat hostile to claims based on arthritis, even where a
plaintiff can identify the specific limitations in terms of the
weight that he or she could lift or the distance that he or she
could walk and/or run.'55
151. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475, superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
152. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998).
153. Barnes, 238 F.Supp. 2d at 1069.
154. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing
Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc, 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8hCir. 1997).
155. See, e.g., Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106, 109 (upholding summary judgment in favor of
employer where Kelly indicated that he could not walk more than a mile as a result
of his degenerative joint disease); Selandia v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
CIVSO31551LKKPANPS, slip op at *1, *5 (E.D. Cal Feb. 24, 2006) (holding that
restrictions by treating physician that plaintiff was limited by her osteoarthritis to
lifting ten pounds and was precluded from lifting twenty to thirty pounds was not
established by the evidence); but c.f. Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 66
F.Supp. 2d 1053, 1062, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (holding material issue of fact existed
where plaintiff's arthritis and back condition limited her to lifting objects of no
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In Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
upheld summary judgment against Moore, an employee who
claimed that he had been fired as a result of his rheumatoid
arthritis.15 6 Moore controlled his arthritis with medication and
complained of episodic flare-ups once or twice a year that
drastically restricted his movements.15 7 A physical examination
demonstrated that Moore "should not be exposed to 'excessive
cold, wet, damp conditions,"' and a strength evaluation revealed
no diminished strength when compared to an average man of
his size and weight. 5 8 After his required annual physical, Moore
was terminated when his employer determined that he was not
qualified for any open positions within the company.159
The Seventh Circuit, using the above standards to
determine disability discrimination and disability under the
ADA, concluded that rheumatoid arthritis is an impairment
under the ADA.160 However, the court held that even if Moore
had raised walking as a major life activity (which he failed to do
in his appellate brief), he still would not have a disability,
because he could walk, and impairments affecting the rate and
pace of walking are not substantial.161 The court rejected
Moore's argument that he was disabled because Moore did not
seek accommodation as a result of the flare-ups, but was rather
seeking to establish disability as a result of this periodic
condition.16 2
Courts have also considered instances where a plaintiff's
arthritic condition limits their abilities to less than that of an
average individual. For example, in Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit held that Talk was not substantially limited
despite the fact that she walked with a limp and at a slower pace

more than ten pounds).
156. Moore, 221 F.3d at 947.
157. Id. at 948.
158. Id. at 949.
159. Id. at 948-49.
160. Id. at 951 n.3.
161. Id. at 951.
162. Id. at 952.
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than an average person.16 Likewise, in Kelly v. Drexel University,
the Third Circuit held that a sixty-eight year-old man who was
unable to walk a mile due to his degenerative joint disease was
not substantially limited in his ability to walk despite the fact
that he walked with a limp and his pace was less than that of an
average man.'1" Additionally, in Penny v. United Parcel Service,
the Sixth Circuit held that moderate difficulty or pain
experienced while walking does not fall under the ADA's
definition of disability.165
Courts have even been reluctant to consider situations
where the plaintiff is able to identify how their arthritis has
limited their ability to perform specific tasks at work.166 For
instance, in Phillip v. Ford Motor Co., the Eighth Circuit held that
Phillip's degenerative joint disease did not substantially limit his
ability to work.' 67 The court observed that while Phillips had
focused on the effect of his limitations on his work related
activities (suggesting that he in fact could not perform specific
tasks), he had failed to identify how his limitations affected
activities of daily living.168 The court noted that Phillips retained
the physical ability to operate a weed whacker, walk up and
down stairs, care for his personal hygiene, wash his car, and do
basic exercises.1 69
Phillip, Talk, Penny, and Kelly illustrate the potential
difficulty that older disabled plaintiffs who have arthritis may
face under the ADAAA. For example, both Talk and Kelly
demonstrated that their physical abilities were less than an
average person. Phillips contended that his arthritis limited his
ability to perform specific tasks on his job. In the instance of
Talk and Kelly, both individuals retained the ability, albeit
somewhat impaired, to perform a specific task. With regard to
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999).
Kelly, 94 F.3d at 104, 106, 108.
Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1022, 1024.
Id. at 1024-25.
Id. at 1025.
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Phillips, he remained able to perform certain tasks around the
house, a fact that seemed to have undercut his argument that his
degenerative joint disease had an impact on his major life
activities. When promulgated, the EEOC's new definition of
"substantially limits" will affect whether any of the above
individuals will be considered disabled under the ADA.
A plaintiff similarly situated to Moore in terms of
experiencing periodic or intermittent flare-ups of arthritis may
find the ADAAA to be substantially helpful. Barnes v. Northwest
Iowa Health Center serves to illustrate how plaintiffs experiencing
periodic or intermittent flare-ups may fare under the ADAAA. 170
Barnes experienced flare-ups of her rheumatoid arthritis
approximately six times per year, which, according to her
physicians, left her totally disabled, because she was unable to
perform any activities of daily living.' 7 ' The court noted that
Barnes' rheumatoid arthritis was generally "mild," but applying
an individualized inquiry, the court held that Barnes generated
an issue of fact as to whether the frequency and severity of her
impairment during these flare-ups were substantially limiting.172
VISION Loss

Restrictive ADA holdings have encompassed other
impairments commonly associated with aging. In Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court held that the ADA
"requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act's
protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence that the
extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in
loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial."17 '
While the Court also asserted "people with monocular vision
'ordinarily' will meet the Act's definition of disability," 174 the
Fourth Circuit has since observed that vision problems that are
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See generally Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053.
Id. at 1075-76.
Id. at 1077-78.
Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 567.
Id.
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at all viewed as temporary or likely to improve would not
qualify as a disability. 75
A serious, lasting vision impairment may survive summary
judgment on an evaluation of the substantial impairment of the
major life activity of the ability to see. 176 In Cutrera v. Board of
Supervisors of LSU, a plaintiff with Stargardt's disease, an
uncorrectable visual impairment with no known cure or
treatment, was terminated from her research position at LSU.177
Following Albertson's, the court determined that the severe
deterioration of the plaintiff's vision presented "a genuine
question of material fact with respect to a substantial limitation
on her ability to see," and reversed the District Court's grant of
summary judgment on this point."7 Following the ADAAA, the
courts will have to focus their analysis on the alleged disability
during the active period of such an impairment. 179
Courts have also examined situations where vision
limitations exist in conjunction with other impairments. In
Puckett v. Park Place Entm't, Corp., a cocktail waitress who was
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) was left without a job
when her employer refused to provide her with work after her
diagnosis.180 The court cited blurred vision as one of the many
relevant symptoms accompanying MS'8 ' and acknowledged that
MS is a physical impairment that impacted the major life events

175. Palotai v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, No. 01-1147, slip op at **8 (4th Cir.
June 27, 2002) (quoting Pollard v. High's of Balt., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir.
2002) (here, vision problems were a result of an accident).
176. Citrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of LSU, 429 F.3d 108, 111-12 (5th Cir. 2005).
177. Id. at 110, 112.
178. Id. at 111-12, 114 (This was a severe case. The plaintiff's condition was
uncorrectable, untreatable, and likely progressive, and according to presented
evidence, she had "virtually no central vision in her left eye, and little in her
right.").
179. Long, supra note 65, at 221.
180. Puckett v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 332 F.Supp. 2d 1349, 1351-52 (D. Nev.
2004).
181. Id. at 1353 (To the court, these symptoms include "numbness, pain, fatigue,
cramps, blurred vision, fainting spells, forgetfulness, loss of balance, and
incontinence." Id.) (quoting Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1174
(10th Cir. 1999)).
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of working and lifting. 18 2 However, even including impaired
vision (admittedly chronic) with other symptoms, the court
found that these major life events were not significantly
impaired.183
More relevant to the common hardships of the elderly is a
case involving a plaintiff suffering from congenital statutory
night blindness, which prevented driving, seeing, and general
functioning at night and in dim light. 184 In Capobianco v. City of
New York, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant, finding that there
was substantial evidence in the record that the plaintiff's night
blindness, which prevented him from holding many jobs
involving night work, substantially limited the major life activity
of seeing.18 s
In Wade v. General Motors Corp., an electrician had
developed night vision problems that impacted his ability to
drive home from his normal shift (2:15 p.m. to 10:45 p.m.). 186
The court found that "[t]he inability to drive in darkness is a
common phenomenon that, if classified as disabling, would
make most of the American population over the age of forty-five
'disabled' under the Act."11 7 The court specifically stated that
"Congress could not have intended such a result" and affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for the employer.18
Such cases of restrictive ADA interpretation for vision
loss/impairment situations are likely to be affected by the
182. Puckett, 332 F. Supp.2d at 1353.
183. Id. at 1354; see also Vandeveer v. Fort James Corp., 192 F.Supp. 2d 918 (E.D.
Wis. 2002) (plaintiff's MS symptoms explicitly included blurred vision; her ADA
claim was also rejected by the court, although the court made it clear that the
plaintiff's insistence on pro se representation worked against her).
184. Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2nd Cir. 2005).
185. Id. at 58-59.
186. Wade, No. 97-3378, slip op at *1.
187. Id. slip op at *2.
188. Id. (For an examination of a court's treatment of a case that examines the
monocular vision issue under a state disability statute that the court sees as very
broad (unlike the intent of the ADA, according to the court), see EEOC v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 424 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005) and its treatment of suits by
applicants denied for UPS driver positions under California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act.)

212

MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR

[Vol. 10

changes mandated by Congress in the ADAAA. Because of new
broad "major life activities," potential changes to "substantial
limits" definitions, and the prohibition on the consideration of
mitigating measures, plaintiffs are much more likely to have
their impairments qualify as disabilities under the new
framework.
HEART DISEASE

Numerous courts have considered the ADA claims of
individuals with heart disease. Although heart disease does
constitute a physical impairment under the ADA, 89 a heart
condition is not a per se disability.190 With the decision in Sutton,
the corrective measures a plaintiff has used to mitigate their
impairments would be relevant to a court's decision.' 9 The
Sutton decision has had a profound impact on the ability of
plaintiffs to successfully allege an ADA claim.192 In Jewell v.
Reid's Confectionary Company, Jewell, who was a commercial
driver, had two heart attacks, after which he had a defibrillator
implanted. 93 The court held that because the plaintiff fully
recovered from his heart attacks with the assistance of the
defibrillator, his heart condition was not substantially limiting.194
Following Sutton, individuals treated with common therapies
following a myocardial infarction, such as a pacemaker,
placement of a vascular stent in the coronary arteries, or usage of
beta blockers, have found their ADA claims foreclosed.195
In light of the individualized inquiry that courts utilize in
analyzing ADA claims, it is difficult to identify trend lines in
circuit court decisions involving heart disease. Nonetheless,
189. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (A) (a)(3) (2007).
190. See Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F.Supp. 2d 212, 216-17 (D. Me.
2001); Weber, 186 F.3d at 913.
191. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475, superseded by statute, Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
192. See id.
193. Jewel, 172 F.Supp. 2d at 214.
194. Id. at 216-17.
195. Id.
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cases decided prior to Williams may have predictive value as to
how courts will treat heart disease ADA claims under the
ADAAA.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hilburn v. Murata
Electronics North America illustrates the fundamental importance
for a practitioner to identify in specific terms how a plaintiff's
coronary artery disease substantially limits a major life
activity. 196 Hilburn began working in 1976 as a machine
operator, and received favorable employee evaluations.197
Hilburn argued that her coronary heart disease substantially
limited several of her major life activities. 98 In the fall of 1989,
Hilburn was diagnosed with coronary artery disease following a
heart attack, which allegedly limited her ability to lift, run, and
perform essential manual tasks. 199 Hilburn's condition, as well
as personal issues, caused Hilburn to miss approximately 184
days of work between June 1988 and the end of 1992; Hilburn
was terminated in March of 1993.200
The court did not find a conclusory statement by the
treating physician to be persuasive, given the lack of any specific
facts that would corroborate the conclusion. 201 In concluding
that Hilburn had not shown that her coronary artery disease had
limited her ability to run, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to
Hilburn's acknowledgment that she could walk and run as
inadequate to support of finding that she was substantially
limited in this activity. 20 2 The court further rejected a statement
made by Hilburn's treating physician that she had "diminished
activity tolerance for .

.

. running."2 03 With regard to Hilburn's

alleged diminished capacity to perform manual tasks, Hilburn
was unable to identify any specific tasks that she would be

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See generally Hilbum v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., 181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1222-23.
Id. at 1223-24.
Id. at 1227-28.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
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unable to do. 20 4 In her deposition, Hilburn indicated she was
able to do a number of activities including walking, running,
standing, sitting, eating, bathing, writing, cooking, and working

around her house. 205
In Weber v. Strippit, Inc., the Eight Circuit considered the
ADA claim of Weber, who had a major heart attack at age fiftyfour and was subsequently diagnosed with heart disease.2 06
Following his return to work, Weber was informed that he could
be required to relocate and retrain.2 7 After a subsequent
angioplasty, Weber was ordered to either relocate from
Minneapolis to Akron, Ohio or take a position at a much lower
salary. 208 Weber conceded that his impairment did not limit his
major life activity of working, but argued that he was limited in
his ability in eating, walking, shoveling snow, gardening,
mowing the lawn, playing tennis, fishing, and hiking. 209 The
court held that Weber's heart disease did not automatically
qualify as a disability under the ADA. 2 10 The court found that
Weber's dietary restrictions and difficulty walking and climbing
stairs were moderate (but not substantial) limitations on his
major life activities, and thus no disability existed under the
ADA. 211
However, in Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions,Inc., the Second
Circuit held that the heart attack of a thirty-one year-old man
satisfied the definition of disability 212 under the New York
Human Rights Law (NYHRL) 213 and New York City
204. Id. at 1228.
205. Id.

206. Weber, 186 F.3d at 910.
207. Id.

208. Id.
209. Id. at 913-14.
210. Id. at 913.
211. Id. at 914.
212. Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 227, 233 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(holding that although Weissman had pleaded an ADA claim, the Court did not
need to evaluate whether he was disabled under the ADA because Weissman
merely had to satisfy the broader standard under the State and City statutes).
213. The NYHRL defines disability as "(a) a physical, mental or medical
impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological
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Administrative Code (Code).2 14 After Weissman's heart attack,
he informed his employer that his doctors had indicated he
would need four to five weeks to recover. 2 15 After being placed
on disability leave, Weissman was terminated less than a week
later.2 16 While the court found ample evidence to support the
jury's finding that Weissman was disabled under the broad
standard enunciated in the NYHRL and Code,217 today it is
probable that courts would draw a similar conclusion under the
ADAAA.
It is likely that the ADAAA would not have affected the
court's decision in Hillburn. The impact of the ADAAA on a case
similar to the fact pattern in Weber is more difficult to anticipate.
Weber was limited in his life activities, 218 but it is not clear he
would have prevailed even if he had been able to specify his
ability to walk given courts' reluctance to draw "a bright line
delineating the point at which a condition affecting an
employee's ability to walk can be regarded as a disability within

the ADA." 219
The decision in Weissman, however, might shed light on
how heart disease will be treated under the ADAAA. As noted
earlier, the ADAAA now defines a major life activity to include
the operation of major bodily functions. 220 While the Code
specifically mentions cardiovascular disease, 22 1 heart disease

conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is
demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques ...
or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment. . . ." N.Y. Exec. Law §
292(21) (Consol. 2008).
214. The Code provides that a disability is "any physical, medical, mental or
psychological impairment, or a history or record of such impairment." NYC
Administrative Code § 8-102(16)(a) (2007). The Code further defines a "physical . .
. impairment" as "an impairment of any system of the body; including, but not
limited to .. . the cardiovascular system." Id. (b)(1).
215. Weissman, 214 F.3d at 227.
216. Id. at 227-28.
217. Id. at 233.
218. Weber, 186 F.3d at 914.
219. Kelly, 94 F.3d at 108.
220. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 3406, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008).
221. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 102(16)(b)(1) (2007).
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would impact a number of the bodily functions identified in
ADAAA, including the respiratory and circulatory systems. 222
Thus, practitioners may find the ADAAA useful in pleading
ADA cases involving heart disease.
CONCLUSION

The ADAAA is a positive development for advocates of
older, disabled individuals. In light of the ADAAA's clear
rejection of Williams and Sutton, older, disabled individuals may
have greater success in asserting an ADA claim. More certain is
that older individuals who have impairments that are controlled
by medication or other assistive devices, are likely to find that
they are able to establish that their impairments substantially
limit a major life activity. 223 This change should impact those
older individuals, for instance, whose cardiovascular
impairment is controlled by a pacemaker.
Additionally, for plaintiffs whose impairments are by
nature episodic or currently in remission, the ADAAA may
provide relief as courts will now be able to engage in a
hypothetical inquiry as to whether the dormant impairment
would substantially limit a major life activity.22 4 This change
will affect, for instance, older individuals whose arthritis is
intermittent or whose acute myelogenous leukemia is in
remission.
Less certain is the impact for individuals such as the
plaintiffs in Talk, Penny, or Kelly, or others who have ADA
claims based on factors of disability plus age.225 In support of its
222. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,

§ 3406, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008).
223. Long, supra note 65, at 220-21.
224. Id. at 221.
225. Fentonmiller & Semmel, supra note 13, at 288 (Fentonmiller suggests that a
"plus" factor analysis might work in either ADA or ADEA litigation); see Good v.
U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., Civ. No. 93-302-FR, slip op at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 1995)
(The court appeared to recognize a hybrid age and sex discrimination claim,
without stating whether the claim was cognizable under Title VII or the ADEA.
However, we found no instance where a district court explicitly adopted an age
plus disability theory of liability under the ADEA or disability plus age theory
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conclusion, the court in Kelly reasoned that EEOC regulations
instructing that "[t]o rise to the level of a disability, an
impairment must significantly restrict an individual's major life
activities," undermined Kelly's contention that his less than
average physical abilities rendered him disabled.22 6 Congress
did not offer a new definition of "substantially limits" and left
this task to the EEOC to adopt a standard consistent with the
ADAAA. 227 Arguably, the new definition will be less restrictive
in light of the spirit of the ADAAA and the expected impact of
the Obama administration on EEOC.
SECTION IV
The ADAAA represents, in the view of one commentator, a
"long overdue" change that may help some plaintiffs prove their
disability substantially impairs a major life activity. 228 As noted
above, one of the advantages of filing an ADA claim instead of
an ADEA claim is that an ADA plaintiff can seek reasonable
accommodation. If a plaintiff can satisfy the first two prongs,
the next issue that will become important is whether the
plaintiff's requested reasonable accommodation was, in fact,
reasonable. 2 29 One difficulty facing courts is that Congress has
not provided guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation. 23 0 Unfortunately, the ADAAA does not offer a
better definition of reasonable accommodation than the original
ADA, which could be detrimental the older disabled
individuals. 231
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Filar v. Board of Education of

under the ADA.).
226. Kelly, 94 F.3d at 107-08 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 902-19).
227. Long, supra note 65, at 219-20.
228. Long, supra note 65, at 229.
229. The Amendments Act, however, does provide that individuals who are
"regarded as" having a disability are not entitled to reasonable accommodation.
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3406,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
230. Long, supra note 65, at 225.
231. Id.
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the City of Chicago232 illustrates how a seemingly valid ADA claim
can easily fail 233 because of the reasonable accommodation
requirement. In Filar, the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on a sixty-nine year-old
plaintiff's ADEA claim, and upheld the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Chicago Public Schools (CPS)
on Filar's ADA claim. 2 34 In 1999, Filar - then sixty-nine years
old - was moved by CPS from full-time status to substitute
teaching. 35 Filar argued that the change in her employment
status was due to her age because younger teachers in her
department had been retained, and her osteoarthritis (combined
with her reliance on public transportation) made her commute
to various locations around the city difficult. 236 Filar requested
that she be assigned to one school with minimum distance from
public transportation. 23 7
The Seventh Circuit determined that Filar's request to work
at one school was unreasonable because (1) it amounted to
preferential treatment;238 (2) under the collective bargaining
agreement, the school board was not responsible for assigning
232. See generally Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 1054 (7th
Cir. 2008).
233. Despite the restrictive legal environment for ADA claim success, courts
have on occasion found qualifying disabilities requiring accommodation. In Ward
v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., Inc., a lab assistant/data entry assistant on flex
time schedule sued under the ADA, alleging that he was terminated as a result of
his arthritis and that his employer failed to accommodate his schedule. Ward, 209
F.3d. at 31-32. Ward had been warned about his tardiness and stated that he
informed his supervisor that he was late because of stiffness and pain caused by his
arthritis in the mornings. Id. The court found that "for purposes of reviewing
summary judgment, there is sufficient evidence that his condition 'substantially
limits' major life activities." Id. at 33 n.3. The court held that as a result of the
nature of his job (data entry), "there is little evidence in the record that a regular
and predictable schedule is an essential function of Ward's data entry position, or
alternatively, that his requested accommodation - an open-ended schedule - would
be an undue burden on his employer." Id. at 33 The court reversed the summary
judgment by the district court, finding issues of fact relating to the reasonableness
of the requested accommodation and whether Ward's tardiness was caused by his
disability. Id. at 38.
234. Filar,526 F.3d at 1056.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1056.
237. Id. at 1059.
238. Id. at 1067-68.
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teachers to specific schools, and a principal could not be
required by the board to take a particular substitute teacher; and
(3) that Filar's request was "simply too barebones to show the
request was reasonable." 23 9 The court reasoned that CPS could
either assign Filar to one of her requested schools-in violation
of the teacher's collective bargaining agreement-or undertake
the costly task of researching schools that would fit the
parameters of Filar's request.2 40
The court's acceptance of the argument that it would be too
costly to make a reasonable accommodation to Filar illustrates a
difficulty that older, disabled plaintiffs will have in seeking a
reasonable accommodation. Putting aside the other factors the
court considered, the argument that a study of what schools
would satisfy the parameters of Filar's request is somewhat
questionable. Obviously, if Filar worked for a small business
whose space required $10,000 in modifications, the burden of
this cost to the business should be considered. However, in
Chicago, the Chicago Transit Authority's web site24 1 allows users
to enter their address and destination. Users will receive a result
that includes what public transportation to use, including buses
or trains, and the distance that an individual must walk to get to
their destination. Thus, in Filar's case, the only cost associated
with studying which schools she could access, would be labor
costs, which would appear to have been minimal to CPS.
Nonetheless, this approach of focusing on the economic cost
is somewhat shortsighted because it does not consider the
potential economic loss of a valued, older employee, whose
wealth of experiences can make positive contributions to an
employer, not only in terms of production, but also in terms of
development of younger employees. In considering a requested
reasonable accommodation, courts should try to balance the
"reasonableness" of the request with the positive gains that will

239.
240.
241.
/travel

Id, at 1068.
Id.
Chicago Transit Authority, Trip Planners, http://www.transitchicago.com
inforamtion/trip-planner.aspx (last visited March 11, 2009).
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CONCLUSION
Courts have expressed some concern about the relationship of
the ADA and age related impairments. 243 This concern, or
perhaps skepticism, seems consistent with the Supreme Court's
observation that "intentional discrimination on the basis of age
has not occurred at the same levels as discrimination against
those protected by Title VII. 2 44 While this assertion may be true,
with a population that is aging, it is likely that there will be a rise
in the number of cases where individuals are discriminated
against on the basis of age and disability. 245 The question then
remains whether the ADAAA and the ADA will provide the
remedy for the older, disabled individual. Shaw and Filar
illustrate that a seemingly good ADA claim may fail, and if
Shaw and Filar had not been replaced by younger workers, their
ADEA claims would have failed as well. The ADA and ADEA
ignore the reality of claims that sit at the crossroads of age and
disability, as neither statute was written to address age plus
disability (or disability plus age). A practical solution would be
to adopt a flexible age plus disability standard, but the courts
have been reluctant to utilize the plus factor standard as used in
Title VII cases. The question should thus be asked whether new
legislation should be drafted to better provide protection for
intersectional claims of age and disability.

242. Barnes, supra note 10, at 300.
243. Wade, No. 97-3378, slip op at *1, *2 (noting, in dicta, that "[t]he inability to
drive in darkness is a common phenomenon that, if classified as disabling, would
make most of the American population over the age of 45 'disabled' under the
Act").
244. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241.
245. Barnes, supra note 10, at 296 (noting that by 2030 those over age sixty-five
will be twenty percent of the U.S. population).

